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Recent Developments 
Adloo v. H. T. Brown Real Estate, Inc. 
Reversing a decision of the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland in Adloo v. H T. 
Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 
254, 686 A.2d 298 (1996), held 
that liability release language con-
tained in an agreement executed 
between a real estate broker and a 
homeowner did not effectively 
exculpate the broker from damages 
that resulted from the broker's 
negligent acts. 
Abdolrahman and Monireh 
Adloo ("Adloo") signed a real 
estate listing contract and lock-box 
authorization with H.T. Brown 
Real Estate, Inc. ("Brown") for the 
sale of their home. The lock-box 
authorization allowed Brown to 
show the house whenever neces-
sary by placing the key to the 
house outside the door in a box 
secured by a combination lock. 
Both agreements contained clauses 
that stated Brown was not liable 
for any loss or damage to the 
Adloo's personal property. Brown 
received a call from a third party 
claiming to be an agent for another 
real estate company. He requested 
the lock-box combination for the 
Adloo residence in order to show 
the house to a prospective buyer. 
Brown eventually determined that 
the caller had offered false 
credentials, but only after giving 
the combination to the caller. 
Almost $40,000 in cash, jewelry, 
and other personal property was 
taken from the residence. 
After settling a claim with their 
own insurance carrier, the Adloos 
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filed a petition in the Circuit Court 
for Montgomery County to recover 
damages from Brown for the 
stolen property. A jury awarded 
the Adloos $20,000 in damages. 
In an unreported opinion, the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland reversed the trial court. 
The court of special appeals held 
that the exculpatory clauses in the 
agreements precluded the claim 
against Brown. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to decide whether the 
lower appellate court erred when it 
held that Brown was not liable for 
the damages. 
First, the court established that 
exculpatory clauses in contracts 
are generally valid in Maryland, 
with a few limited exceptions. 
Adloo, 344 Md. at 259, 686 A.2d 
at 301 (citing Wolf v. Ford, 335 
Md. 525,531,644 A.2d 522, 525 
(1994». The court reasoned that 
the important question in this case 
was whether the clauses in the 
signed agreements were actually 
exculpatory in nature. Adloo, 344 
Md. at 261,686 A.2d at 301. The 
court focused on the intent of the 
parties. Id. 
The court relied upon the law 
of contract interpretation and 
construction to determine if the 
clauses were created to exculpate 
Brown from its own negligence. 
!d. The general rule states that a 
contract will not be interpreted to 
indemnify a person's own negli-
gence unless such meaning is 
clearly expressed. Id. at 261-62, 
686 A.2d at 302 (citing Crockett v. 
Crothers, 264 Md. 222,227,285 
A.2d 612,615 (1972». Therefore, 
the court looked to the language of 
the lock-box agreement to deter-
mine the meaning a reasonable 
person would have deduced from 
its terms. 
The court reasoned that when 
the language of a contract was 
clear and unambiguous, a literal 
interpretation is required. Adloo at 
266, 686 A.2d at 304 (citing 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. 
v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 
A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985». Since 
Maryland follows the objective 
law of contracts, the court held that 
when the terms are unclear and 
ambiguous, parol evidence may be 
introduced; otherwise, the clause is 
construed against the author. Id. 
(citing Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 
Md. App. 173, 399 A.2d 1374 
(1979». The specific language of 
the lock-box agreement read that 
"SELLER further acknowledges 
that neither Listing or Selling 
BROKER nor their agents are an 
insurer against the loss of personal 
property; SELLER agrees to waive 
and release BROKER and his 
agents and/or cooperating agents 
and brokers from any respon-
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sibility therefore." Adloo at 258, 
686 A.2d at 300. The literal read-
ing of this statement led the court 
to conclude that the language 
meant that a real estate broker is 
not an insurer against the loss of 
personal property. Id. at 267, 686 
A.2d at 305. In addition, the court 
reasoned that a logical person 
would expect this clause to apply 
to situations when a real estate 
broker was showing the home to a 
prospective client and property 
was stolen. Id. at 267-68, 686 
A.2d at 305. 
The court pointed out, how-
ever, that it would be highly 
unlikely for the parties to have 
read this statement and to have 
thought of the scenario that 
resulted in this case. Id. There-
fore, this clause did not address 
situations where a broker's own 
negligence directly caused the loss 
of property. Id. 
Although the court did not 
analyze the language of the listing 
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contract in the same step by step 
manner, it concluded that its 
language did not clearly exculpate 
Brown from its own negligent acts. 
Id. The clause in question stated 
Brown was not responsible for 
"vandalism, theft or damage of any 
nature to the property." Id. at 257, 
686 A.2d at 300. The court rea-
soned that there was no mention of 
relieving liability due to Brown's 
own negligence. Thus, the court 
concluded it was ambiguous and 
was not an exculpatory clause in 
relation to this case. /d. at 268, 
686 A.2d at 305. 
Neither clause clearly nor 
unequivocally stated the parties' 
intention to insulate Brown from 
liability for its own acts of neg-
ligence. /d. Without such clear 
evidence, the court relied upon 
past decisions to construe the 
clause against the author and 
reinstate the damages awarded by 
the trial court. 
The clauses in both of the 
agreements appeared on the 
surface to exculpate real estate 
brokers from certain liabilities. 
The circumstances in the instant 
case, however, have caused the 
court to read the language of those 
clauses literally. The holding in 
Adloo informs attorneys drafting 
real estate contracts of the need to 
provide specific language 
regarding the broker's own neg-
ligence. The decision also calls 
into question the effectiveness of a 
lock-box arrangement. In addi-
tion, the holding in this case could 
have implications beyond real 
estate law because all of the cases 
relied upon by the court dealt with 
different types of contract issues. 
Furthermore, Adloo demonstrates 
the court's desire to literally 
construe exculpatory clauses, and 
emphasizes the importance of 
clearly expressing the intent of the 
parties when drafting a contract. 
